10.3.06

Formula for understanding: multiply thickness factor by X and add alcohol

Not a recipe for making Easter pudding or anything but basically an outlook on life--hey, it's worked for me in my over a quarter of a century of time on Earth.

After today's TS session on Richard Rorty (who, despite my attempt to kill him off, is apparently still alive), I felt like maybe I should learn to articulate better what I reckon. Or, maybe, other people would be better off blogging (actually, everyone would be better off blogging).

What led to this conclusion on my part was a good session (sitting out in the open, enjoying this unseasonably warm weather) of discussion on U.S. pragmatism. There were numerous tangents (as there always are) and it was rather enjoyable though the aspects of Rorty that I enjoyed (his subtle putting down of Asish Nandy being one of them--notice his qualifications on his understanding of Nandy's work, qualifications which are missing when he discusses other philosophers like Derrida and Heidegger) were not a big part of the discussion. At times, the discussion felt like we were all agreeing with Rorty (which, I think most of us were) but that there were some differences which got talked over/through/around.

As usual, there was a discussion of power and the commment that Rorty didn't have a theory of power. But, he did (more on this perhaps some other time. Or, more on why I thought he did have a theory of power, based on the bits and pieces of his we read).

It was his move of denying words have intrinsic meanings to them was what resonated with me. As one of "my" folk says, "...I am not trying to resolve classic philosophical disputes between, say, advocates of realism and anti-realism. And I am certainly not trying to answer ontological questions about what sorts of things exist. The focus is on the way people construct descriptions as factual, and how other [use and] undermine those constructions. This does not require an answer to the philosophical question of what factuality is. Nevertheless, this approach cannot fail to have implications for broader debates about the status of realism and relativism, and about the appropriate ontology for social sciences (Potter, 1996: 6)." The interlinkages with (the little) what I've read about U.S. pragmatism are fairly clear here.

The point being that observable stuff are what is important, what makes us able to talk about the metaphysical questions that have plagued philosophers for eons. We do it through telling stories and acting out in social relations. Nothing more. Nothing less. There's no stuff-ness in stuff (I told yous I had little articulatory skills) but, instead, stuff becomes stuff through involvement in various activities and processes and through descriptions in language. People matter and what they say and do matter--rather than trying to figure out whether there is such a thing called reality (or freedom) and what is means (and what it is), we'd be better off looking at processes through which institutions and people account for freedom (and lack thereof) in their daily activities and talks.

In other words, take on the tropes used in the attacks on your position rather than getting bogged down in details about ontology, epistemology and a whole bunch of dead white blokes that, frankly, I've not read. Take on the foundations and question the assumptions of the positionings of the questioner(s) and, usually, that's enough to get you (me) through and start a debate (possibly even a fight).

As some of my other folks put it, "...constructionist arguments are not aimed at denying the existence of tables (a very realist idea!) but at exploring the various ways in which their reality is constructed and undermined (Potter, 1996: 7)".

So, no table-thumpings please. Especially not that BigNameConference is coming up. Or, if you have to thump tables, be prepared to explain how that justifies your position.

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